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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between financial wealth,
reservation wages and labour market transitions. According to the theory,
higher levels of wealth will result in higher reservation wages and lower
employment probabilities. We test for the validity of this assumption by
estimating a simultaneous equations model of reservation wages, labour
market transitions and wealth. The data used for the analysis relate to a
sample of unemployed job searchers drawn from the Dutch Socio-Economic
Panel. Wealth is found to have a significantly positive impact on the reser-
vation wage. The overall impact of wealth on the employment probability is
negative though small.
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1 Introduction
The literature on labour market transitions is extensive1. However,
there are very few studies that have looked at the relationship between
asset holdings and labour market transitions.
The job search literature has tended to ignore the impact of financial
wealth on job search by implicitly assuming risk neutrality. Typically,
this has lead to the specification of the individual objective function in
terms of income maximization rather than utility maximization. Dan-
forth (1979) shows that financial asset holdings and acceptance wages
are positively correlated, under the assumptions of consumption maxi-
mization and decreasing absolute risk aversion. Blundell et al. (1995)
investigate the relationship between savings and labour market transi-
tions, deriving a negative relationship between initial wealth and the
probability of staying or becoming employed, under the assumption
that leisure is a normal good.
Financial assets are absent from most empirical models of labour
market transitions. Bloemen (1995) estimates the impact of assets on
labour market transitions, using a Dutch dataset. He finds evidence of
a negative relationship between savings and the probability of becom-
ing employed. Stancanelli (1994 and 1996) estimates the impact of
individual financial resources on the duration of unemployment spells,
using UK data. She finds a significantly negative impact of financial
resources on unemployment duration.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the job seeker’s asset
holdings on the reservation wage and the employment probability.
The dataset we use contains information on individual asset holdings,
labour market transitions and subjective reservation wages. The avail-
ability of reservation wages allows us to measure directly the impact
of wealth on the individuals’ job acceptance strategies. This is an
advantage as compared to previous empirical studies which measured
the effect of wealth only via labour market transitions.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the next Section,
the theoretical model is laid out. The empirical model is specified in
Section 3. The data are described in Section 4. Results of estimation
1See, for example, Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) or Devine and Kiefer (1991) for an
account.
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are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, conclusions are drawn.
2 The Theoretical Framework
Typically job search models have assumed that individuals are in-
come maximizers. This implies that individuals are risk neutral. If
this assumption is relaxed, individuals can be described as utility max-
imizers. In this case, financial assets must be taken into account. Here
we show how financial wealth may enter a job search model along
the lines of the structural model put forward by Danforth (1979). The
reader is referred to Danforth (1979) for a formal derivation.
We set up a model of unemployed job search. Individuals are
assumed to maximize the utility they derive from consumption. They
are faced by an intertemporal budget constraint defining the relation
between consumption, income and wealth accumulation. Utility is
assumed to be intertemporally separable and the utility functions are
of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Individual’s utility can be
written as in Danforth (1979, p. 112):




where t is the discount factor. Utility is assumed to be twice
differentiable and strictly concave. The assumption of strict concavity
implies that individuals are risk averse.
Jobs are characterized in terms of the wage they offer. The prob-
ability of receiving a job offer is t2. Job offers are characterized
in terms of a stochastic wage offer distribution F (w) with density
function f(w). Jobs last forever and no recall of job offers is allowed.
The budget constraint restricts individual assets at time t to be
equal to assets the previous period plus income minus consumption
goods purchased the previous period3. Defining At as wealth at the
beginning of period t, b as unemployment income,w as the individual
2Danforth assumes that the offer probability is constant in each time period and equal to one
offer per period.
3Danforth sets a limit to the end of period borrowing capacity.
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wage, c as consumption and r as the constant interest rate, the budget
constraint reads:
At = [At 1   ct 1 + b](1 + r); (2)
for the unemployed, and
At = [At 1   ct 1 + w](1 + r); (3)
for employed persons.
The employed person’s maximum utility is given by:
J(A;w) = max
c
fu(c) + J(A  c+ w)(1 + r); w]g; (4)
and the unemployed person’s maximum utility is:
S(A) = max
c





maxfS[(A  c+ b)](1 + r)]; (5)
J [(A  c+ b)(1 + r); w]gdF (w)g
It follows that a job offer is accepted if J(A;w) > S(A) and
rejected otherwise. The reservation wage, w, can be defined as that
wage offer at which individuals are indifferent between continuing to
search or accepting the job offer, i. e. as that wage at which J(A;w) =
S(A). As a result, the reservation wage will also be a function of
individual asset holdings: w = w(A). In particular, reservation
wages are increasing in financial assets, under given conditions which
rule out risk neutrality. For example, Danforth (1979) shows that
this is true under the assumption of absolute decreasing risk aversion,
requiring  u00=u0 to be a decreasing function of ct.
The employment probability, , can be written as the product of
the probabilities of receiving a given job offer and accepting it:
 = [1   F (w(A)] (6)
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3 The empirical model
The complexity of the dynamic programming problem (5) prevents
us from finding an analytic solution for the reservation wage w(A),
which characterizes the individual’s optimal search strategy. For this
reason, applied work so far concentrated on specifying the transition
probability including wealth as a regressor. In doing so, much of the
original model structure of (6) is lost. In particular, it is ignored that
wealth enters the structural probability (6), because of its effect on the
reservation wage, which, in turn, affects the acceptance probability by
the wage offer distribution. If reservation wages are in the lower tail of
the wage distribution the effect of wealth on the transition probability
may be hard to measure. Furthermore, wealth may be correlated with
the job offer probability. If this is the case, it is not clear what effect
is being measured when estimating a single equation model of the
transition probability.
In this paper, we use data on reservation wages to exhibit the
relation between wealth, reservation wages and transitions. In order
to so, we estimate jointly the acceptance probability and the job offer
probability.
We specify our empirical model as a simultaneous equation system.
Job offers are characterized in terms of the attached wage. The wage
offer distribution is assumed to be lognormal and specified as follows:
lnwit = m
0kit + eit eit  N(0; 
2); (7)
where i relates to individual i in the population of unemployed job
searchers and k are individual characteristics. The parameters of
the wage offer distribution, m, are estimated from lognormal wage
regressions for the population of the employed, corrected for selection
into employment of labour force participants (see Table A).
Reservation wages are specified lognormally as a function of in-
dividual characteristics, R indicating the logarithm of the observed
reservation wage:
Rit = g(Ait) + 
0Xit + it; it  N(0; 
2
 ) (8)
whereXit is a vector containing individual characteristics and elapsed
5
unemployment duration4. The functional form g is specified as a
quadratic to allow for non-linearities. The right hand side of (8) has
the interpretation of an approximation to the solution of a structural
search model. The error term it may represent approximation error,
measurement error and randomness in preferences.
To allow for possible correlation of wealth with the error of the
reservation wage equation, an equation for wealth is specified: 5
Ait = 
0qi;t 1 + vi;t 1; vi;t 1  N(0; 
2
v); (9)
where q includes individual characteristics and elapsed unemployment
duration. Period t   1 values of characteristics are used as Ait is
decided upon in that period.
The probability of receiving any job offer is parameterized as
P (job offer) = it = 1   exp( it); (10)
where it is a positive parameter. The larger its value, the higher will




where  is a parameter and zit includes individual characteristics,
among which may be elapsed unemployment duration at the time.
We assume joint normality of the error terms of the wage equation,
the reservation wage equation and the equation for wealth. We define
1 as the correlation coefficient between the wage errors eit from
(7) and the errors it of the reservation wage equation (8), 2 as the
correlation coefficient between wage errors and the wealth errorsvi;t 1
from (9), and 3 as the correlation between wealth and reservation
wages.
A job offer is accepted if the attached wage exceeds the reserva-
tion wage. Under the assumption of joint normality, the acceptance
4The data available allow one to construct some broadly approximate measure of elapsed
unemployment duration.
5Note that it follows from the theoretical model specified by Danforth (1979), that the value of
wealth (in its role as state variable), prior to the period in which the transition may be observed,
is used. So for the transition, wealth acts as a lagged endogenous variable. Correlations in errors
may however occur due to random preferences, other types of unobserved heterogeneity, selectivity
bias, or measurement error.
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probability, conditional on wealth and the observed reservation wage,
can be written as:
P (lnwit > RitjRit; Ait) = 1  
 
Rit  m




with (:) the standard normal distribution function, and use has been
made of the normality of the distribution of wages, conditional on
wealth and reservation wages.  (eitjit; vi;t 1) refers to the part of the
conditional mean that arises due to possible nonzero correlation be-
tween the errors of the equations, and ej;v is the conditional variance
of the wage error term.
The probability of observing a transition during period t, then can











For each individual, the likelihood contribution can be constructed
by multiplying the transition probability (or one minus the transition
probability if no transition occurs) by the joint density of wealth and
reservation wages. For individuals whose reservation wage is not
observed, we integrate over reservation wages6.
Wealth enters the model as one of the simultaneous equation and
as a regressor (in quadratic form) in the reservation wage equation.
Therefore, wealth is allowed to affect the job finding probability indi-
rectly via the reservation wage equation and via possible error auto-
correlations.
We test whether there is a direct effect of wealth on the job offer
probability by including wealth (a quadratic in wealth) in zit. This
amounts to assuming that the level of individual wealth may affect not
only the reservation wage but also the offer probability. The validity
of this assumption is tested by means of a likelihood ratio test.
6For a few observations, we do observe the reservation wage, but not whether or not a transition
occurred. For those observations the likelihood contribution is given by the joint density of
reservation wages and wealth.
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4 The data
We use for the analysis a panel dataset of the Dutch population, the
Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) collected by Statistics Netherlands (CB-
S). The SEP sample is drawn from the population of Dutch households
and includes all household members aged sixteen or over. The advan-
tage of the SEP over alternative data sources is that it contains detailed
information on the level of individual assets and covers a broad range
of assets types. Furthermore, information on reservation wages was
collected, though only in a few waves.
The survey was started in the early eighties. Questions on assets
were asked from 1987 onwards. In the eighties waves were conducted
every six month and information was collected alternatively on asset
holdings and income. Information on individual assets was then
available in the April waves of the panel; information on income
was collected in the October waves. From the nineties, information
on assets is collected at the same time with information on income
and the (May) waves are conducted on a yearly basis.
We selected for the analysis a sample of individuals with the fol-
lowing characteristics:
 household heads;
 actively searching for a job;
 not employed;
 present in at least two consecutive waves;
 that reported asset holdings.
We focus on household heads in order to select a fairly homoge-
nous sample. In particular, when analyzing the reliability of the replies
to the questions on subjective reservation wages by comparing sub-
jective reservation wages with previous wages and accepted wages,
we concluded that such information was not very sensible for non-
household heads. Further, we selected individuals that reported to
be actively searching for a job and not already in employment in a
given wave. Individuals were required to be present in at least two
consecutive waves. A transition into employment is recorded if exit
into a job is observed within the following year —October waves for
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the eighties and May waves in the nineties. We measure assets in the
preceding April wave for the eighty waves and in May later on.
We pool waves and control for time effects with wave dummies.
The resulting sample consists of 552 observations. We observe 167
transitions into employment. We observe reservation wages and ex-
pected hours for 284 individuals, which amounts to about 50% of our
sample.
Descriptive statistics of the income and assets variables are pro-
vided in Table 1. These variables are measured in real terms in 1987
prices. We use monthly price indices to deflate the variables7. Wealth
is defined as net financial assets. We exclude the value of the mortgage
and the value of the house from our definition of wealth, given the
likely measurement error problems with these variables. We construct
dummies for house ownership and for the presence of mortgage. Our
wealth measure is equal to the sum of debt (net of mortgage) and
savings (net of the value of the house). The unit of measurement is
guilders. We define unemployment income as including unemploy-
ment benefits, either unemployment insurance or social assistance.
Other income includes any other social security benefits —such as for
instance child benefit— the income of the partner (when not given
separately) and any other income. All income variables are defined in
guilders per month.
Reservation wages and hours constitute “subjective information”
in the sense that they are self-reported by the survey participants —
like any other information in the survey. First, the respondents were
asked how many hours they expected to work each week in a new job.
Then, they were asked to report the level of the minimum acceptable
net monthly income for a job with a number of working hours equal
to their expected hours of work.
The reservation wage amounts appear very reasonable. The mini-
mum full-time wage in the Netherlands is currently about 1200 Dutch
guilders per month and it was about the same at the time considered
in the analysis —the level of inflation in the Netherlands is very low.
The mean and standard deviation of the reservation wage distribu-
tion are equal, respectively, to about 1500 guilders and 600 guilders.
Also the reported expected hours seem plausible. The mean of the
7Source: CBS social economic monthly statistics
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distribution is about 33 hours. This indicates that not everybody is
willing to take up a full-time job, as reasonable. Hour preferences
may play an important role in the reservation wage equation.
We show frequencies of the discrete variables in Table 2. The
educational level dummies are defined in increasing order from the
lowest, primary school level, level 1, to the highest, university and
vocational colleges training, level 4. The education sectors dummies
in Table 2 are defined as follows. Sector 1, the reference sector, re-
lates to individuals without skill specific education. Sector 2 includes
mathematics, chemics, biology and other technical skills. Sector 3
refers to medical and economic/administrative skills. Sector 4 in-
cludes agriculture, transportation and social skills.
5 Results of estimation
In this Section, we discuss the results of estimation of the model.
First, we illustrate single equation estimates of the reservation wage
equation. Next, maximum likelihood estimates of the joint model
of reservation wages, wealth and transitions are discussed. Finally,
elasticities for different groups of the unemployed are calculated.
5.1 The Reservation Wage Equation
Under standard assumptions, the reservation wage equation (8) can
be estimated by OLS. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the
reservation wage. Since the reservation wage is reported on the basis
of expected hours of work, the logarithm of expected hours has also
been included among the regressors. The parameter estimates are
presented in Table 3. For the function g(Ait) we have specified a
quadratic form. Our findings indicate that individual wealth has a
significant positive impact on the reservation wage. This is in line
with the theoretical expectations. A 100% increase in financial assets
(at the mean level of assets) is found to increase the reservation wage
by 1.1%.
Overall, our results are very plausible. We find that the reservation
wage increases with expected hours. The coefficient estimate of hours
is smaller than 1, indicating that the reservation wage increases less
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than proportionally with hours. Higher unemployment benefits have
a significant positive impact on the reservation wage. Other income
has also a positive though not significant impact on the reservation
wage. Higher educated people have significantly higher reservation
wages, as reasonable. Age is found to have a significant and non-
linear effect on reservation wages: its effect is positive until age 36
and negative after. Interactions of age and wealth did not improve on
the specification of the model.
We model the effect of gender on the reservation wage with a dum-
my for “woman” and an interaction variable of women and expected
hours of work. Our findings indicate that reservation wages of wom-
en increase faster with working hours than reservation wages of men.
Nevertheless, women have significantly lower reservation wages than
men on average. We tried interacting women or women and hours
with children, but no interaction variable was found significant. We
consider here only household heads and most single women do not
appear to be “lone mothers”, i. e. they do not have children. There-
fore, children are not so important in explaining reservation wages
and expected hours of women. Probably for the same reasons, a dum-
my for marital status was found not significant8. The dummies for
house ownership and for the presence of a mortgage were found not
significant, also when included separately. Variables like sectors of
education dummies and dummies for the duration of unemployment
turned out not to have significant effects.
In order to apply OLS to equation (8), the explanatory variables,
Xit and Ait, must be uncorrelated with the disturbances it. Indi-
vidual effects may cause correlation between Ait and it. Similarly,
measurement error in wealth may introduce correlation with it. In
these cases, OLS is inconsistent and IV may be the more appropriate
method of estimation. Therefore, we carried out an Hausman test. The
test statistic is based on the difference between the OLS estimator and
the IV estimator of the reservation wage equation. We use as instru-
ments all variables included in the reservation wage equation (except
for wealth), other income, the square of other income, cross-effects
8A dummy for “married people” captures basically the situation of married men. We found
that, in spite of its insignificance, this dummy was correlated with wealth. Its inclusion made the
wealth variables less significant. This is plausible since married men are typically wealthier than
single people, also because they are often older and have more work experience.
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of age and other income. The choice of instruments was made on
the basis of estimation of first stage regressions of wealth and wealth
squared on possible instruments. On the basis of the value of the test
statistic (0.46), we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation.
5.2 Joint Model of Transitions and Reservation Wages
Results of estimation of the joint model of transitions, reservation
wages and wealth, described in equations (13), (8) and (9) are given
in Table 4.
First of all, we have found insignificant correlations terms between
the errors of the wealth equation and the errors of, respectively, the
reservation wage equation and the job offer probability. Therefore, we
have re-estimated the model assuming zero error correlations of wealth
and the reservation wage; and of wealth and the offer probability.
Also on the basis of a likelihood ratio test this restriction could not be
rejected (2 = 1:77).
Generally all the variables in the reservation wage equation have
the expected sign and are significant as earlier on. The impact of
the explanatory variables does not vary significantly with respect to
the results of estimation of the single equation presented earlier on
(Table 3). The results of estimation confirm the finding that wealth
has a significant positive effect on the reservation wage.
We have plotted predicted reservation wages for different hours,
for men and women in Figure 1. The explanatory variables of the
reservation wage have been set equal to their mean value (except for
gender) while hours have been allowed to vary between 3 and 50,
which correspond to the minimum and maximum observed values
for hours in the sample. Reservation wages by hours have been
computed for men and women separately. In Figure 1, it is shown that
that reservation wages increase with hours and that men have higher
reservation wages than women, for any hours less than 40 hours. For
more than 40 hours, women have higher reservation wages than men.
This arises from the combined effect of the woman dummy and the
interaction of woman and hours.
In Figure 2, we plot reservation wages for different levels of wealth.
The range of values considered for wealth goes from the second to
the nineth decile (included). We excluded the first and the last decile
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to avoid extreme values. The other explanatory variables of the reser-
vation wage were set equal to their mean value. The plot shows that
reservation wages increase with increasing levels of wealth, as dis-
cussed above. Non-linearities do not show up in the plot since they
only apply to extreme values of the wealth distribution.
Results of estimation of the offer probability, indicate that elapsed
duration plays a significant role in explaining the individual proba-
bility of receiving a job offer. The reference group for the elapsed
unemployment duration dummies are individuals that have been un-
employed for less than 6 months. Elapsed duration is statistically
significant and negative. This is actually in line with the assumption
made by Blanchard and Diamond (1994) in their matching model,
where it is assumed that job seekers are ranked by employers only
according to their unemployment duration. Those with longer unem-
ployment durations are assumed to be the last to receive a job offer.
Women appear to have a significantly higher offer probability than
men, which is perhaps surprising. On the other hand, this finding
might be explained by some kind of job segregation effect and by the
fact that Dutch women tend to represent a more flexible segment of
the labour force, given their availability to work part-time and their
hystorically low participation rates.
The separate coefficient estimates of age and age squared are found
to affect insignificantly the offer probability. However, the two age
variables are jointly significant. If the term in age squared is dropped
from the model age becomes significant and the negative effect dom-
inates. The education dummies are generally not very significant.
With respect to the wealth equation, the following comments are
in order. Most explanatory variables in the wealth equation are lagged
one period, since wealth is measured one period earlier than transi-
tions. Other income and income of the spouse are measured a time
period earlier than the corresponding variables in the reservation wage
equation. Other income has a significant positive impact on wealth.
Significant non-linearities are also detected. The income of the spouse
is insignificant. Age has a significant non-linear impact on wealth.
An interaction variable of age and other income shows a significantly
negative impact. Education levels are insignificant.
Finally, to test whether there is a separate effect of wealth on the
offer probability, the model has been re-estimated with wealth and
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wealth squared as additional regressors in the job offer equation. On
the basis of a likelihood ratio test (equal to 0.88), the null hypothesis
that the coefficients on these additional wealth terms are different from
zero cannot be rejected. We also tested whether wealth and wealth
squared have a non zero impact on the offer probability when the
duration dummies are excluded from the offer probability. On the
basis of a likelihood ratio test (equal to 2.38) we cannot reject the null.
We conclude that on the basis of our empirical findings there appear
to be no separate effect of wealth on the offer probability. Wealth is
found to affect the transition probability only via the reservation wage.
In Figure 3, we plot the predicted acceptance probability and the
predicted employment or transition probability—equal to the product
of the acceptance and the offer probablities— for different levels of
wealth. The other explanatory variables are set equal to their mean
sample values. As previously discussed, the plot shows that both the
acceptance probability and the transition probability decrease with
increasing levels of wealth.
5.3 Elasticities
To gain more insights on the relation between wealth, reservation
wages and labour market transitions, we have calculated some elastic-
ities. The estimated elasticities and their standard errors are reported
in Table 5. The ML estimates of the parameters in Table 4 are used to
calculate, respectively, the elasticity of the reservation wage with re-
spect to wealth, the elasticity of the transition probability with respect
to the reservation wage and the elasticity of the transition probability
with respect to wealth. We have calculated these elasticities for dif-
ferent values of background characteristics and different individuals.
We have computed the elasticities above for the low educated, the
high educated and for women. First, elasticities have been computed
at the sample means of the explanatory variables for these three groups
of the unemployed. For example, for the low educated, all variables
have been assumed to take their sample means except for the education
dummies that have been set equal to zero —the reference group for
the education dummies are precisely the low-educated. In the case of
the high educated, all variables have been set equal to their sample
means; the education dummies have been set equal to zero except
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for education level 4, which has been fixed at value one. Similarly,
for women, all variables have been equalized to their sample means
except for the gender dummy which has been given value one. Next,
elasticities have been computed at the mean values of the explanatory
variables for each of the three subgroups of, respectively, the low
educated, the high educated and women.
The elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to wealth is
significantly positive for all the subgroups considered. Since the
dependent variable of the reservation wage equation is in logarithms,
the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to wealth evaluated
at the sample means is the same for the three subgroups. The same
elasticity, evaluated at the means for each subgroup, is found to be the
highest for the higher educated and the lowest for women. The size of
the elasticity is rather small. A 100% increase in the level of wealth
would result in a 1.2% increase in the reservation wage of the high
educated.
The elasticity of the transition probability with respect to the reser-
vation wage is significantly negative and it reaches the highest value
in absolute terms for women. The same elasticity is higher for the
lower educated than for the higher educated. The size of the impact
is rather large. A 10% increase in the level of the reservation wage
would lower by 32% the employment probability for women.
Finally, the elasticity of the transition probability with respect to
wealth is significantly negative, though small for all the three groups.
The impact of wealth is found to be the largest, in absolute value, for
women. An increase of 100% in the level of wealth would lower a
woman’s employment probability by 4.1% on average.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of financial asset hold-
ings on the individual employment probability. Theoretical work in
the area of structural models of job search (Danforth, 1979) indicates
that financial wealth has a positive impact on the reservation wage.
Previous applied work in this field restricted attention to the impact
of savings on the employment probability (Bloemen, 1995) and the
duration of the unemployment spells (Stancanelli, 1994 and 1996).
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The limitation of these studies is that they do not allow explicitly for
an impact of wealth on the reservation wage.
On the basis of the estimation of a reservation wage equation, we
conclude that wealth has a significant positive effect on the reservation
wage. Overall, our findings concerning the reservation wage equation
are very reasonable and in line with theoretical expectations. Age is
found to have a significant effect on the reservation wage. Reservation
wages increase less than proportionally with hours and they are sig-
nificantly lower for women. We reject the possibility of measurement
error or endogeneity of wealth on the basis of a Hausman test.
Next, we have estimated a simultaneous equations model of transi-
tions into employment, reservation wages and wealth. In this model,
the employment probability is equal to the product of the acceptance
probability (job offers are accepted when the reservation wage exceeds
the mean of the wage offer distribution) and the offer probability.
We find no significant correlation of the errors of the wealth equa-
tion and the errors of, respectively, the reservation wage equation and
the offer probability equation.
We are able to conclude that financial wealth has a positive impact
on the reservation wage and a negative impact on the employment
probability. Higher levels of wealth result in higher reservation wages
and higher reservation wages are associated with a lower employment
probability. The hypothesis that wealth has a separate influence on
the offer probability was tested by means of a likelihood ratio test and
rejected.
We have estimated the elasticities of the reservation wage with
respect to the level of wealth and of the transition probability with
respect to the reservation wage and to the level of wealth. We have
computed these elasticities for the low educated, the high educated and
women, at sample means and at subgroup means. The estimates of
the elasticities show that the overall impact of wealth on the transition
probability is small.
An interesting policy question is whether higher levels of wealth
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Table 1: Asset Holdings, Unemployment Income and Reservation Wages
Variable Mean Sd
Wealth 4228.15 21818.7
Reservation Wage 1521.6 603.1
U Income 1163.1 653.9
U Income* 1281.5 564.9
Other income 249.2 520.0
Other income* 366.0 500.1
Spouse’s Income 203.6 547.0
Spouse’s Income* 1158.7 772.6
Expected Hours 32.8 9.8
Age 35.9 10.3
The units of measurement of the income variables is guilders per month, in real terms at 1987 prices. The
number of observations is 552. The * indicates the distribution recomputed excluding the zero’s. The number of
individuals that report non zero amounts is 97 for spouse’s income, 501 for unemployment uncome (U Income),
403 for other income. The Reservation Wage is available for 287 observations. Expected hours are available for
290 observations. There are 284 observations for which both hours and reservation wages are observed.
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Table 2: Discrete Background Variables
Variable Sample Percentage
Education level 2 27.4
Education level 3 31.1
Education level 4 19.1
Education sector 2 23.4
Education sector 3 18.1




Duration 0-6 months 22.8
Duration 7-16 months 13.9




The number of observations is 552.
Table 3: The Reservation Wage Equation: Estimation by OLS
The dependent variable is log (reservation wage)
Variable Coefficient S E
Constant -4.89* 2.52
Any child 0.085** 0.036
Woman -1.14** 0.27
Log(age) 4.95** 1.45
Log(age) squared -0.67** 0.20
U Income, 1000 fl 0.044* 0.024
U Other Income -0.0000013 0.000025
Log (hours) 0.85** 0.06
Educ. Level 2 0.019 0.043
Educ. Level 3 0.14** 0.04
Educ. Level 4 0.20** 0.06
Woman by Log(Hours) 0.31** 0.08
Wealth, 10000 fl 0.029** 0.01
Wealth squared -0.0012** 0.0004
Wave 2 -0.013 0.032
 0.311
Adjusted R2 0.7772
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the (net) reservation wage per month,
in Dutch guilders (fl). The number of observations for which both the reservation
wage and the expected hours were available is 284. All the financial variables
(income, wealth, unemployment income) are measured in real terms, in 1987 prices
for all years. One wave dummy appears (wave2, 1988) since reservation wages
are observed in 1988 and 1989. U stands for Unemployment. Education L’s are
the individual education levels measured from the lower level up. The base for the
dummy is education level 1. Education L4 corresponds to higher education. **
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; a * indicates statistical significance
at the 10% level. Descriptive statistics of the variables are given in Tables 1 and 2.
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Name Coeff S E Coeff SE Coeff SE
Constant -7.22** 2.64 -13.1 18.1 48.1** 19.2
Any child 0.087** 0.036
Woman -1.12** 0.24 0.73** 0.34 -0.11 0.34
Log(age) 6.27** 1.52 9.82 10.4 -27.6** 11.0
Log(age) squared -0.85** 0.21 -1.67 1.48 3.93** 1.58
U Income, 1000 fl 0.037 0.026
U Other Income, 1000 fl -0.0036 0.026
Log (hours) 0.84** 0.05
Educ. Level 2 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.36
Educ. Level 3 0.13** 0.06 0.54 0.39
Educ. Level 4 0.18** 0.06 -0.07 0.41
Woman by Log(Hours) 0.30** 0.07
Wealth, 10000 fl 0.029* 0.012
(Wealth, 10000 fl) squared -0.0012 0.0016
Elapsed Dur 6-16 m 0.085 0.055 -0.44 0.44
Elapsed Dur > 16 m -0.045 0.050 -1.44** 0.34
Wave 1987 or 1988 -0.024 0.034
Wave 1 (1987) -0.14 0.36 -0.23 0.53
Wave 2 (1988) -0.51 0.40 0.10 0.56
Wave 3 (1989) -1.36** 0.47 -0.19 0.57
Any Child (t-1) -0.37 0.27
Educ. Lev 2 (t-1) 0.14 0.53
Educ. Lev 3 (t-1) 0.26 0.44
Educ. Lev 4 (t-1) 0.09 0.56
Other Income (t-1), 1000 fl 13.9** 1.9
Other Income (t-1) squared 0.32** 0.05
Ln(age) OtherY (t-1) -3.43** 0.48
Spouse Income (t-1), 1000 fl -3.76 3.70
Spouse Income (t-1), squared -0.25 0.18






The model estimated is specified in Equations 8, and 9, 13. The value of the log-likelihood is -1470.22.
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; a * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. The
correlation coefficients 1, 2, 3 relate respectively to correlations of the errors of Equations 7 and 8, 7 and 9,
8 and 9. In this version 2 and 3 are restricted to zero. The value of the likelihood ratio test for the validity of
these restriction is 1.77.
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Figure 1: Predicted Reservation Wages by Hours by Gender
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Figure 2: Predicted Reservation Wages by Wealth Levels
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities for Different Wealth Levels
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Table 5: Estimated Elasticities
Elasticity Value SE
Reservation wage to wealth (1a) 0.013 0.00578
Reservation wage to wealth (2a) 0.013 0.00578
Reservation wage to wealth (3a) 0.013 0.00578
Reservation wage to wealth (1b) 0.012 0.00510
Reservation wage to wealth (2b) 0.0062 0.00264
Reservation wage to wealth (3b) 0.0013 0.00568
Transition probability to reservation wage (1a) -1.84 0.0704
Transition probability to reservation wage (2a) -1.91 0.129
Transition probability to reservation wage (3a) -1.91 0.125
Transition probability to reservation wage (1b) -1.87 0.123
Transition probability to reservation wage (2b) -2.12 0.120
Transition probability to reservation wage (3b) -3.18 0.174
Transition probability to wealth (1a) -0.024 0.0106
Transition probability to wealth (2a) -0.025 0.0109
Transition probability to wealth (3a) -0.025 0.0109
Transition probability to wealth (1b) -0.022 0.0095
Transition probability to wealth (2b) -0.013 0.0056
Transition probability to wealth (3b) -0.041 0.0178
The elasticities defined as 1, 2, 3 relate, respectively, to the high skilled, the low
skilled and women. The elasticities (a) and (b) relate, respectively, for each group
1, 2, 3, to the elasticities computed using the sample means (a) or the subgroups
means (b).
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Appendix: The wage offer distribution
Table A: The Offer Distribution and the Selection Equation
Variable The selection equation The offer distribution
Variable Coefficient S E Coefficient S E
Constant 11.39* 3.31 -7.17* 0.60
Any child 0.16* 0.06
Woman -0.51* 0.06 -0.53* 0.04
Log(age) -5.73* 1.86 6.31* 0.33
Log(age) squared 0.80* 0.26 -0.82* 0.05
Educ. Level 2 0.18* 0.08 0.083* 0.02
Educ. Level 3 0.49 * 0.08 0.16 0.02
Educ. Level 4 0.52* 0.08 0.44* 0.02
Educ. Sector 2 0.11* 0.07 -0.035* 0.01
Educ Sector 3 0.26* 0.7 0.06 * 0.01
Educ. Sector 4 0.22* 0.08 -0.06 * 0.01
Single -0.29* 0.07
Spouse Income 0.17* 0.04
Other Income 0.085* 0.06
Wave 87 -0.09 0.05 -0.002 0.009
Wave 88 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.009
Log Hours 0.82* 0.06
Log Hours Sq -0.02 * 0.01
Woman by Log Hours 0.009 * 0.001
Heckman’s correction -0.007 0.093
Log-lik -1865.9
R2 0.57
The selection equation is specified as a probit of the probability of being employed. The probability
is defined over the sample of unemployed job searchers (552 persons) and employed individuals
(9230 persons) in any of the waves considered for the analysis. The probability of being employed
takes value one for the employed persons, zero for the unemployed searchers. The offer probability
is estimated by OLS controlling for sample selectivity along the lines of Heckman’s two steps
procedure. Heckman’s correction is computed as the inverse Mill’s ratio. The dependent variable
is the logarithm of the employment wage. U stands for Unemployment. Education L’s are the
individual education levels measured from the lower level up. The base for the dummy is education
level 1. Education L4 corresponds to higher education.
25
